

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00853 281252Z
ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0853

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PDEV, RH, UK, SF
SUBJECT: RHODESIA: CONTACT WITH MUZOREWA AND SOUTH AFRICANS

REF: STATE 050906 AND 050937

1. SUMMARY: IN OUR VIEW THERE IS SERIOUS RISK THAT POSITION SET FORTH IN US-UK AGREED TALKING POINTS FOR MUZOREWA AND SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY NYERERE AS RENEGING ON BASIC UNDERSTANDING WITH HIM. I BELIEVE TALKING POINTS AND/OR APPROACH ON THEM SHOULD BE REVISED. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD AT LEAST TELL NYERERE AND FRONT LINE WHAT WE ARE DOING AND WHY.
END SUMMARY.

2. I REALIZE THAT THERE ARE MANY FACTORS BEARING ON OUR RHODESIAN POLICY AT THIS TIME. FURTHER, EVEN IF THE US
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WANTED TO STICK STRICTLY TO THE AAP, IN ORDER TO KEEP THE BRITISH ON BOARD, IT MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE THEIR NEEDS AND DESIRES INTO ACCOUNT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT SEEMS TO ME, WE MUST AVOID APPEARING TO RENEGE ON OUR ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS WITH THE FRONT LINE. IF WE DO AND CONSEQUENTLY LOSE THEIR TRUST, AND IF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT ABORTS, WE WILL FIND OURSELVES IN THE WORST POSSIBLE SITUATION: NO SOLUTION TO RHODESIA AND

NO BASIS FOR FURTHER COOPERATION WITH THE FRONT LINE (AND PROBABLY THE OAU ALSO).

3. THE TALKING POINTS FOR THE FRONT LINE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY (STATE 049706) DO NOT RENEGE ON BASIC PRINCIPLES. THEY ARE SILENT ON THE ROLE OF SMITH DURING THE TRANSITION AND ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY FORCES.

4. HOWEVER, TWO OF THE TALKING POINTS FOR MUZOREWA AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS (AND BEYOND FOR SMITH HIMSELF) (STATE 050906 AND 050937) WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED BY NYERERE AS COMPROMISING ELEMENTS WHICH HE CONSIDERS HAVE BEEN AGREED BETWEEN US: (A) "IF SMITH MUST HAVE A ROLE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, (B) "GUERRILLA MILITARY LEADERS MUST HAVE A RESPONSIBLE PLACE IN THE NEW COMMAND STRUGGLE". NYERERE IS SIMPLY NOT GOING TO FIND THESE STATEMENTS COMPATIBLE WITH (A) "NO ROLE FOR SMITH", AND (B) "ARMY TO BE BASED ON LIBERATION FORCES WITH ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF RDF", AGREEMENT ON WHICH HE BELIEVES WAS REACHED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON.

5. THESE DISCREPANCIES WILL GET BACK TO NYERERE AND THE FRONT LINE. THE PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WHEN THEY ARE DELIVERED IS GOING TO TIE US TO THEM. THE QUESTION IS WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT.

6. MY FIRST RECOMMENDATION IS TO INSERT INTO THE TALKING POINTS
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FOR MUZOREWA PHRASES THAT ARE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR PREVIOUS POSITION, EMG., SMITH MUST NOT HAVE A ROLE IN THE TRANSITION, AND THE SECURITY FORCES MUST BE REBUILT AROUND THE LIBERATION FORCES. (THE CARVER-CHAND PLAN).

7. IF THAT WON'T WORK, CAN'T WE DROP ANY RECOMMENDATIONS TO MUZOREWA ON THESE POINTS? HASN'T OWEN ALREADY MADE THEM UNILATERALLY TO SITHOLE IN LONDON ANYWAY?

8. IF WE HAVE TO STICK TO THE POINTS, DOES THE US AMBASSADOR HAVE TO ACCOMPANY HIS BRITISH COLLEAGUE WHEN THEY ARE PRESENTED?

9. IF WE ARE INEVITABLY COMMITTED TO THE COURSE PROPOSED IN STATE 050906 AND 050937, SHOULDN'T WE BE HONEST WITH NYERERE AND THE OTHER FL LEADERS AND REVISE OUR TALKING POINTS FOR THEM TO INCLUDE WHAT WE ARE SAYING TO MUZOREWA AND WHY WE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY AND USEFUL TO SAY IT?

10. IN ANY CASE, NYERERE MAY SOON GO FOR THE JUGULAR AND RAISE THOSE POINTS ON HIS OWN. I FRANKLY WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH HOPE IN HOLDING HIM FOLLOWING ANY DISCLOSURE THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER

A ROLE FOR SMITH AND DIMINISHED ONE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES.
THIN REED TO GRASP MIGHT BE ARGUMENT THAT OUR MAJOR FOCUS
REMAINS TO ENSURE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS IS IRREVERSIBLE. IT
WOULD BE UP TO US TO DEMONSTRATE HOW SMITH'S PRESENCE IN
GOVERNMENT AND MODIFIED ROLE FOR LIBERATION FORCES WOULD NOT
UNDERMINE THAT.
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